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Abstract 
This paper examines the relation between share pledging and cash holdings of Chinese A-share listed-firms. We find that 
during the years 2005 through 2015, the level of share pledging is negatively associated with cash holdings. We establish 
causality through a variety of econometric techniques, including a difference-in-differences approach based on a 
regulatory change that permits security companies to lend money to borrowers pledging their shares as collaterals. In 
addition, we find that the main effect is more prominent for financial constrained firms, and share pledging is associated 
with lower cash/investment-cash flow sensitivities and more cash dividend payouts. Overall, our findings indicate that 
share pledging can alleviate financial constraints of listed firms and reduce their tendencies of holding cash for 
precautionary motives. 
Keywords: Share pledge, Corporate cash holdings, financial constraints, difference-in-difference approach 
1. Introduction 
Share pledging, the practice of shareholders use their shares as collaterals to obtain loans, has attracted much attention 
among academia and practitioners in the last a few years. In this paper, we examine whether share pledging has 
first-order effect on firm cash holdings. This issue is important, as cash is of vital importance to firms in easing financial 
frictions and seizing investment opportunities while vulnerable to expropriation by firm insiders due to its liquid nature.  
Theoretically, the relation between share pledging and firm cash holdings is ambiguous. On the one hand, share 
pledging can lead to a decrease in cash holdings. Firms can accumulate cash in order to hedge against operating risks 
and sustain daily operations. Serving as an additional source of obtaining useful funds, firms will be less financial 
constrained and therefore hold less cash for precautionary motives if they pledge more shares as collaterals. We term 
this view the financial constraint channel.  
On the other hand, a positive relation could exist. Controlling shareholders with pledged shares may face a margin call 
threat if stock prices fall below the required level for a loan, and they have an incentive to use corporate resources for 
their private benefits (Chan et al., 2018). Due to concerns on potential margin calls, firm insiders may choose to hold 
more cash for precautionary motives.  
In addition, share pledging may have no significant effect on firm cash policies. Many times, firm insiders use stocks as 
collaterals for personal usage, and additional financing to controlling shareholders does not equal to additional 
financing to the listed firm. Therefore, the practice of pledging shares may have no direct link with firms’ cash holding 
decisions. 
Due to these different predictions, whether and how share pledging affects firms’ cash holding decisions is an empirical 
question. In this paper, we build our empirical setting on the Chinese stock market where the ownership structure of 
listed firms is rather concentrated and the practice of share pledging is pervasive. We begin our research by conducting 
a regression analysis to examine the association between share pledging and firm cash holdings, and document that on 
average, one standard deviation increase in share pledging is associated with a 2.4% decrease in cash holdings. 
In the following sections, we take several steps to validate our baseline findings. As certain types of firms are more 
likely to have their shares pledged (Li et al., 2019), we employ Heckman’s (1979) two stage model to address the 
self-selection issue of pledging shares. The estimation results provide little support for the notion that the observed 
negative relationship is due to a self-selection problem. 
Applied Finance and Accounting                                          Vol. 7, No. 2; 2021 
42 
The CSRC comes up a regulatory change in 2013. By utilizing this regulatory change as a quasi-exogenous shock to 
share pledging, we can infer a causal effect on firm cash holdings. Based on firm characteristics of the prior year of the 
regulatory change, we build up a PSM sample (propensity-score matched) and conduct differences-in-differences 
estimation. Our choice of treatment and control groups resembles prior studies that use decimalization as an exogenous 
positive shock to stock market liquidity (Fang et al., 2014; Brogaard et al., 2017). i.e., the treatment group consists of 
firms whose amount of pledged shares increases the most (in the top three deciles of the sample) due to the regulatory 
change, and the control group includes propensity-score matched firms whose amount of pledge shares increases less 
but with comparable firm characteristics. Using a differences-in-differences approach, we show that following the 
regulatory change, an average treatment firm, relative to an average control firm, experiences a 9.0% decrease in cash 
holdings, which further suggest a negative causal effect of share pledging on firm cash holdings. 
We then conduct several additional tests. We confirm that our main findings are robust to various alternative model 
specifications and sample selections. We further find that the negative effect of share pledging is more prominent for 
financial-constrained firms, and firms with more pledged shares have lower cash/investment-cash flow sensitivities and 
higher level of cash dividend payouts. These results further indicate that share pledging can alleviate financial 
constraints of firms.  
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. We contribute to the literature on the economic implications of 
share pledging, which pays much attention on firm value, financial reporting, and executive incentives (Chen and Hu, 
2007; Wang and Chou, 2018; Dou et al., 2019; Ouyang et al., 2019). In terms of the real effects of share pledging on 
firms’ investment and financing decisions, Chan et al. (2018) find that firm insiders may initiate share repurchases to 
fend off potential margin calls associated with pledged stocks. Meng et al. (2019) find that share pledging discourages 
risk-taking while improves innovation efficiency. We throw additional light on this literature by examining how share 
pledging affects firms’ cash holding decisions. Li et al. (2019) indicate that there is a positive relation between share 
pledges of the largest shareholder and firm value in China. Our paper provides a specific channel (reducing financial 
constraints) through which share pledges can increase firm value.  
We also contribute to the literature on the determinant of firm cash holdings, particularly the literature that investigates 
how ownership structures and controlling shareholder motives affects cash holdings (e.g., Dittmar et al., 2003; 
Megginson et al., 2014). We identify share pledging as an important factor that reduces firms’ precautionary motives 
and therefore discourages cash holdings. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents institutional background. Section 3 provides data and 
empirical design. Section 4 reports main empirical results. Section 5 provides estimation results on further analysis. 
Section 6 concludes.  
2. Institutional Background 
In China, most listed firms have controlling shareholders, with highly concentrated ownership structures (Jiang and Kim, 
2015). To cope with difficulties in obtaining external financing, controlling shareholders pervasively use their owned 
shares as collateral to borrow money from brokerages, banks, or trust firms. In this way, they can secure credit without 
altering their control rights (Singh, 2017). However, there are risks associated with pledged shares, as regulators and 
analysts often warn that share-pledging can amplify a market downturn. When a stock falls in the secondary market and 
reduces the value of the pledged shares, borrowers have to take out more shares as collateral. Otherwise, they will have 
to sell shares to pay back the principal.1  
Both non-SOEs and SOEs can participate in share pledging. As the Chinse credit market is tight, many small and 
medium-sized non-SOEs have scarce recourse to banks or other sources of financing, and they commonly turn to pledge 
shares to finance companies as a way of raising cash.2 For SOEs, they can pledge shares after getting approved by the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (henceforth SASAC). Although possessing advantages 
in acquiring external financing, SOEs, especially those in capital-intensive industries (i.g. mining, real estate, steel, etc.), 
also pervasively pledge their shares. In June 2018, among the total 1,024 listed SOEs on the A-share market, 1,020 of 






3 http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2018-06-27/doc-iheqpwqx7418663.shtml (in Chinese). 
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The share-pledging loan business on the Chinese stock market has grown quickly. Before 2013, only banks and trust 
firms can participate in share-pledging activities. On May 24, 2013, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
ChinaSecurities Depository and Clearing Co., Ltd. publish a rule (“The Guidance on Stock Pledge Repurchase 
Transactions, Registration, and Settlement”) to guide the development of share pledging, permitting security companies 
to provide finance to borrowers based on pledge shares.4 Compared with banks and trust firms, security companies 
require lower interest rates, have fewer restrictions on the usage of the loans, and approve transactions in a quicker 
manner.5 This regulatory change has prominent real effects on share pledging activities. Since then, the share-pledging 
loan business has grown even faster. The value of shares pledged has expanded by more than Rmb200bn annually since 
2014, according to S&P, taking the total to Rmb5tn ($720bn).6 The volume of pledged-stock loans surpasses 1 trillion 
RMB (US$ 146 billion) in August 2016 and 1.28 trillion RMB (US$ 188 billion) at the end of 2016, an 81% increase 
from 2015.7  
3. Data and Empirical Design 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
Our sample consists of Chinese A-share listed firms. The financial variables and stock data spanning from 2005 to 2015 
are obtained from the CSMAR Database. We select firm-year observations according to the following procedures. First, 
according to the classification standard of the CSRC, we exclude observations from the financial industry, which are 
fundamentally different from non-financial firms. Also, we exclude observations that are in special treatment (ST, *ST, 
and suspension), as these firms have high distress risk and may behave differently from others.8 In addition, all of the 
continuous main variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles in order to alleviate the impact of outliers. Our 
final sample consists of 20,644 firm-year observations.  
3.2 Variable Measurement 
Following previous studies (e.g. Opler et al., 1999; Foley et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2014), we define 
the main dependent variable of cash holdings based on Cash, the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to net assets (total 
assets minus cash and cash equivalents). The main dependent variable, Log(Cash), is then calculated as the logarithm of 
Cash. One of the major advantages of taking the logarithm transformation is to smooth the distribution of cash holdings 
and prevent the results from being influenced by outliers (Bates et al., 2009). We also employ several alternative 
measures for robustness. 
According to a CSRC requirement, firms should make announcements when their large shareholders (i.e., persons with 
more than 5% shareholdings) pledge their shareholdings for loans, making our setting well-suited for a study on the 
economic impacts of share pledging.9 Accordingly, we construct the primary measure of share pledging, Pledge, as the 
amount of shares pledged by controlling shareholders as a percentage of total shares. We also construct an indicator 
variable, Pledge_Dummy, which measures whether the firm involved in share pledging. 
In line with prior studies on firm cash holdings (e.g. Chen et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2016), we include a vector of control 
variables in the baseline model, including firm size, leverage, age, market-to-book ratio, operating cash flow, sales 
growth, capital expenditure, cash flow volatility, dividend payout, and ownership concentration. We provide detailed 
definition on these variables in Table A.1 in the Appendix.  
3.3 Empirical Design 
To examine the impact of share pledging on firm cash holdings, we estimate the following equation: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                            (1) 
where i indexes firm and t indexes year. The coefficient on Pledge, β1, is the one with main interest. We also control for 
firm- (𝑓𝑖) and year- (𝜏𝑡) fixed effects as well as a vector of control variables in the model and cluster standard errors at 
the firm level. 
 
4 http://www.sse.com.cn/lawandrules/sserules/trading/stock/c/c_20150906_3976433.shtml (in Chinese). 
5 http://www.infzm.com/content/137459 (in Chinese). 
6 https://www.ft.com/content/a342e01a-d758-11e8-a854-33d6f82e62f8. 
7 https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-01-15/regulators-limit-pledged-stock-loans-101197973.html. 
8 According to the rule of the CSRC, if a listed firm reports a net loss (below-zero return on equity) for two consecutive 
years, it will be treated as a special treatment (ST) firm; If the firm continues to make losses for one more year, it will 
be treated as a particular special treatment (*ST) firm. My main results still hold if I keep these observations in the 
sample.  
9 http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgz/ssl/201012/t20101231_189729.html (in Chinese). 
Applied Finance and Accounting                                          Vol. 7, No. 2; 2021 
44 
3.4 Summary Statistics 
We report summary statistics of main variables in Table 1. The mean (median) value of Cash is 0.177 (0.132). The mean 
(median) value of Log(Cash) is -1.879 (-1.886), which is close to the mean (median) of -1.933 (-1.865) reported by Xu 
et al. (2016) based on Chinese listed firms from 1998 through 2014. In addition, the mean (median) value of Pledge is 
0.077 (0.000). The mean (median) value of Pledge_Dummy is 0.388 (0.000), indicating that share pledging occurs in 
around 40 percent of the firm-year observations.  
Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Main Variables 
 Num Mean Sd. P25 Median P75 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cash 20,644 0.177 0.148 0.073 0.132 0.234 
Log(Cash) 20,644 -1.879 1.133 -2.543 -1.886 -1.188 
Pledge 20,644 0.077 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.114 
Pledge_Dummy 20,644 0.388 0.487 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Size 20,644 21.738 1.248 20.868 21.601 22.442 
Leverage 20,644 0.465 0.244 0.286 0.461 0.624 
Log(Age) 20,644 1.984 0.854 1.386 2.197 2.639 
MB 20,644 2.159 2.068 0.823 1.529 2.716 
Opcf 20,644 0.044 0.082 0.003 0.044 0.088 
Gsale 20,644 0.124 0.347 -0.025 0.112 0.253 
Capex 20,644 0.058 0.056 0.017 0.041 0.080 
Cf_Sigma 20,644 0.103 0.031 0.081 0.101 0.118 
Div 20,644 0.574 0.494 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Top1 20,644 0.364 0.155 0.241 0.343 0.477 
This table reports the summary statistics of the main variables used in our regressions estimated by the full sample that 
consists of firm-year observations. Columns (1) through (6) report the summary statistics of the variables in the full 
sample. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in this Appendix. 
In Table 2, we report correlation matrix of main variables. Log(Cash) is negatively correlated with Pledge, suggesting 
that firms with more pledged shares tend to have lower cash holdings. As these findings do not control for other 
possible covariates, we lay our conclusion based on multiple regressions.  
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 Log(Cash) Pledge Size Leverage Log(Age) MB Opcf Gsale Capex Cf_Sigma Div Top1 
Log(Cash) 1.00            
Pledge -0.14*** 1.00           











































































































This table reports a Pearson correlation matrix of variables used in the baseline regression. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table A.1 in Appendix. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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4. Empirical Specification and Results 
4.1 Baseline Results 
In Table 3, we report estimation results on the relation between share pledging and firm cash holdings. In Column (1), 
we find the coefficient of Pledge is significantly positive, indicating that share pledging is associated with a higher level 
of cash holdings. In Column (2), we add a series of control variables in the model. The coefficient on Pledge is positive 
and significant at the 5% level. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in share pledging is 
associated with a 2.4% (=1-e-0.180*0.132) decrease in cash holdings. That is, for an average firm with 5,920 million RMB 
total net assets and 0.177 Cash in our sample, this effect corresponds to a reduction in cash holdings of 25.15 
(=5,920*0.177*2.4%) million RMB (or US$ 3.76 million).10 These results indicate that a higher level of share pledging 
is associated with lower cash holdings.  
Table 3. Share Pledging and Firm Cash Holdings 
 Log(Cash) 
 (1) (2) 
Pledge -0.810*** -0.180** 
 (0.103) (0.081) 
Size  0.054** 
  (0.025) 
Leverage  -1.551*** 
  (0.091) 
Log(Age)  -0.886*** 
  (0.027) 
MB  0.052*** 
  (0.008) 
Opcf  1.453*** 
  (0.103) 
Gsale  0.069*** 
  (0.022) 
Capex  -0.607*** 
  (0.152) 
Cf_Sigma  0.815** 
  (0.367) 
Div  0.079*** 
  (0.016) 
Top1  -0.124 
  (0.140) 
Firm FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
N 20,848 20,644 
Adj_R2 0.082 0.303 
This table estimates the effect of share pledging on firm cash holdings. All of the variables are as defined in Table A.1 in 
this Appendix. The sample period covers the years 2005 through 2015. All of our regressions control for year- and 
firm-fixed effects. The robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
4.2 Heckman Two-Stage Approach 
In this section, we address the issue that firms with less cash holdings may self-select to pledge more shares. The first 
stage of this model is a Probit equation which models the choice of pledging shares with Pledge_Dummy as the 
dependent variable. In the second step, we include the inverse Mills ratio derived from the first stage alongside 
Pledge_Dummy and our prior controls. In Column (1), we observe that firms with certain characteristics (i.e. larger size, 
lower investment, higher payout tendency, and less concentrated ownership) have higher tendency of pledging shares. 
In Column (2), the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio is insignificant, suggesting that the self-section issue is not a 
major concern in our setting. More importantly, the coefficient on Pledge_Dummy is negative and significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting that on average, firms with pledged shares have lower level of cash holdings than other firms.  
 
 
10 For this calculation, we assume 1RMB equals to 0.149 US$ (the exchange rate in March 2019). 
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Table 4. The Heckman Two-Stage Approach 
 1st stage 2nd stage 
 Pledge_Dummy Log(Cash) 
 (1) (2) 
Pledge_Dummy  -0.181*** 
  (0.041) 
Size 0.085* 0.070*** 
 (0.044) (0.026) 
Leverage -0.220 -1.573*** 
 (0.178) (0.113) 
Log(Age) -0.030 -0.296*** 
 (0.062) (0.028) 
MB -0.022 0.048*** 
 (0.022) (0.014) 
Opcf -0.418 1.660*** 
 (0.537) (0.258) 
Gsale 0.013 0.117** 
 (0.124) (0.057) 
Capex -1.272* -1.947*** 
 (0.760) (0.430) 
Cf_Sigma 0.520 1.379 
 (1.659) (1.093) 
Div 0.334*** 0.137** 
 (0.105) (0.063) 
Top1 -0.928*** -0.236 
 (0.318) (0.195) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  2.717 
  (7.627) 
Year FE Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y 
N 20,711 20,711 
This table estimates the effect of share pledging on firm cash holdings. All of the variables are as defined in Table A.1 in 
this Appendix. The sample period covers the years 2005 through 2015. All of the regressions control for year- and 
industry-fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The coefficients marked with *, **, and *** 
are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
4.3 Differences-in-Differences Approach 
In the above sections, we show that there is a negative relation between share pledging and firm cash holdings. In this 
section, to further facilitate the identification of a causal relation, we identify a regulatory change in 2013, namely the 
publication of a guidance rule of share pledging (“The Guidance on Stock Pledge Repurchase Transactions, Registration, 
and Settlement”), as a quasi-exogenous positive shock to share pledging, and conduct a differences-in-differences (DiD) 
estimation. This methodology compares the level of cash holdings of a group of treatment firms whose amount of 
pledged shares increases the most to that of control firms whose amount of pledged shares increases less, before and 
after the regulatory change which cause a quasi-exogenous shock to share pledging. could be fundamentally different 
from the rest of the firms 
As indicated in Section II, prior to 2013, only banks and trust firms can participate in share-pledging activities. The rule 
permits security companies to lend money to borrowers using pledged shares as collaterals. As security companies 
require lower interest rates, have fewer restrictions on the usage of the loans, and approve transactions in a quicker 
manner, this regulatory change encourages share pledging activities of listed firms. 
This regulatory change appears to be a good candidate to generate plausibly exogenous variation in share pledging for 
at least two reasons. First, it directly affects share pledging while unlikely to directly affect corporate risk-taking. As 
indicated by the general provision of the rule, the primary goal of the rule is “to regulate share pledging activities, 
maintain the market order, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of all parties involved in the transaction”, 
which has no direct relation with listed firms’ decisions. Second, changes in share pledging surrounding this regulatory 
change exhibit variation in the cross-section of firms. Hence, examining the change in risk-taking following the change 
in share pledging due to the publication of the rule provides a quasi-exogenous shock for our tests. 
To address the concern that firms with pledged shares may fundamentally different from other firms in the sample, we 
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construct a propensity-score matched sample. We start by retaining all observations for treated and control firms in 2012, 
the year before the regulatory change comes into effect. We then use a logistic model to estimate the probability of 
being included in the treatment group by using the control variables in the baseline regression as explanatory variables. 
We match each treated firm to up to two firms in the control group (with replacement) with closest propensity score. 
Finally, the sample includes and 470 treatment firms and 370 control firms.  
The validity of the DiD estimator critically depends on the parallel trend assumption, i.e. the underlying trends in the 
outcome variable should the same for both groups. Following Fang et al. (2014) and Brogaard et al. (2017), we perform 
several diagnostic tests to verify that the assumption holds in our setting. We summarize the results of these tests in 
Table 5.  
Our diagnose tests are four folds. In Panel A, we re-estimate the Probit model used to estimate propensity scores based 
on the post-match sample, and then compare the estimation results with those obtained from the pre-match sample. 
Compared with the estimation results on the baseline Probit model in Column (1), the coefficients on all the explanatory 
variables are not statistically significant in Column (2), suggesting that there are no observable different characteristics 
exist between the treatment and control groups before the regulatory change. In Panel B, we report the distribution of 
the propensity scores for the post-match treatment and control groups and their differences. We can see that the 
distribution of the propensity scores for the two groups is similar, indicating that the two groups’ propensity scores line 
up closely. In Panel C, we conduct a simple univariate test. We calculate the average change of cash holdings before and 
after the regulatory change for both the treatment and the control groups. We observe that treatment firms have 
significant lower cash holdings after the regulation, which serves as an overview of mean differences in cash holdings 
between the treatment and control groups. In Panel D, we report summary statistics on post-match differences. The 
sample mean of control variables for matched treated and control firms are not significantly different, suggesting that 
our selection of matching firms is successful.  







Panel A: Pre-match regression and post-match diagnostic regression 
 Pre-match Post-match 
 (1) (2) 
Size -0.448*** 0.017 
 (0.065) (0.095) 
Leverage 1.082*** 0.109 
 (0.292) (0.442) 
Log(Age) -0.747*** -0.082 
 (0.089) (0.131) 
MB -0.048 0.036 
 (0.049) (0.075) 
Opcf -0.363 -0.463 
 (0.723) (0.987) 
Gsale 0.311** 0.270 
 (0.157) (0.241) 
Capex 1.590* -0.665 
 (0.953) (1.378) 
Cf_Sigma 2.840 0.049 
 (2.903) (4.163) 
Div 0.030 0.115 
 (0.133) (0.189) 
Top1 -0.650* 0.148 
 (0.359) (0.518) 
Industry FE Y Y 
N 2,127 836 
Pseudo_R2 0.134 0.025 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel B: Estimated propensity score distributions     
 Num Mean Sd. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment 470 0.382 0.166 0.063 0.257 0.372 0.506 0.768 
Control 370 0.370 0.164 0.064 0.247 0.353 0.496 0.764 
Difference - 0.012 0.002 -0.001 0.010 0.019 0.010 0.002 
Panel C: Univariate Tests 
   Before After Difference 
   (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment   -1.589 -2.078 -0.489*** 
   (0.028) (0.030) (0.041) 
Control   -1.595 -1.945 -0.350*** 
   (0.031) (0.034) (0.046) 
Diff-in-Diff       -0.139** 
       (0.062) 
Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel D: Post-match differences 
 Treated Control t-value p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Size 21.59 21.56 0.46 0.65 
Leverage 0.42 0.44 -1.21 0.23 
Log(Age) 1.88 1.95 -1.26 0.21 
MB 1.61 1.54 0.80 0.42 
Opcf 0.04 0.04 0.32 0.75 
Gsale 0.09 0.07 0.96 0.34 
Capex 0.07 0.06 0.87 0.38 
Cf_Sigma 0.12 0.12 0.54 0.59 
Div 0.68 0.62 1.85 0.07* 
Top1 0.35 0.35 0.56 0.57 
Panel A presents parameter estimates from the Probit model used to estimate propensity scores for firms in the 
treatment and control groups. Panel B reports the distribution of estimated propensity scores for the treatment 
firms, control firms, and the difference in estimated propensity scores post matching. Panel C presents statistics of 
the post-match differences in propensity score matching attached to the Differences-in-Differences analysis. 
Column (1) presents the sample average of firm characteristics in the treated group. Column (2) presents the 
sample average of firm characteristics in the control group. Column (3) presents the t-test value of the differences 
between Columns (1) and (2). Column (4) presents the significant level of the sample-mean difference test 
between Columns (1) and (2). Definitions of all of these variables are provided in Table A.1 in this Appendix. 
After confirming the validity of our differences-in-differences setting through diagnose tests above, we then test how 
the regulatory change affect firms’ cash holdings, and present estimation results in Table 6. In Column (1), we observe 
negative and significant coefficient on Treat*Post, indicating that compared with control firms, firms experience larger 
decreases in the amount of pledged shares reduce cash holdings significantly. To further confirm that the parallel-trend 
assumption holds in our setting, we present a dynamic test around the regulatory change. Specifically, we replace Post 
with several alternative dummy variables, D11-12, D13, D14, and D15, which represents year 2011 or 2012, 2013, 2014, 
and 2015, respectively. We observe that the negative of the effect of regulation emerges only after the launch of the 
regulation but not before, implying that the plausibly exogenous increase in share pledging triggers the decrease in firm 
cash holdings. In Columns (3)-(4), we include the control variables and observe similar results. According to estimation 
results in Column (3), on average, a treatment firm experiences a 9.0% (=1-e-0.094) decrease in cash holdings relative to a 
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Table 6. Differences-in-Differences Approach 
 Log(Cash) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treat*Post -0.129**  -0.094**  
 (0.052)  (0.046)  
Treat*D11-12  -0.070  -0.070 
  (0.059)  (0.052) 
Treat*D13  -0.191***  -0.154** 
  (0.066)  (0.065) 
Treat*D14  -0.147**  -0.127* 
  (0.073)  (0.072) 
Treat*D15  -0.153*  -0.124* 
  (0.079)  (0.071) 
Size   0.107** 0.108** 
   (0.054) (0.054) 
Leverage   -1.270*** -1.269*** 
   (0.184) (0.184) 
Log(Age)   -1.039*** -1.038*** 
   (0.050) (0.050) 
MB   0.027** 0.026** 
   (0.013) (0.013) 
Opcf   1.251*** 1.257*** 
   (0.175) (0.175) 
Gsale   0.058* 0.059* 
   (0.035) (0.035) 
Capex   -0.994*** -1.000*** 
   (0.250) (0.250) 
Cf_Sigma   1.002 1.013 
   (0.677) (0.677) 
Div   0.029 0.030 
   (0.026) (0.026) 
Top1   -0.424 -0.419 
   (0.261) (0.262) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
N 5,869 5,869 5,458 5,458 
Adj_R2 0.116 0.116 0.360 0.360 
This table estimates the effect of share pledging on corporate risk-taking based on the differences-in-differences 
approach. All of the variables are as defined in Table A.1 in this Appendix. The sample period covers the years 2009 
through 2015. All of our regressions control for year- and firm-fixed effects. The robust standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are 
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
4.4 Robustness Checks 
In this section, we test the robustness of the main finding. Our tests are three folds, we report the results in the following. 
In Table 7, we control for potential omitted variables by including high-degree fixed effects in the model. Estimation 
results indicate that our main findings still hold even if taking city-level and industry-level time-variant omitted 
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Table 7. Including High-degree Fixed Effects 
 Log(Cash) 
 (1) (2) 
Pledge -0.223*** -0.223*** 
 (0.086) (0.083) 
Size 0.055** 0.049* 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
Leverage -1.544*** -1.537*** 
 (0.096) (0.093) 
Log(Age) -0.864*** -0.840*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) 
MB 0.046*** 0.049*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Opcf 1.448*** 1.438*** 
 (0.108) (0.106) 
Gsale 0.066*** 0.057** 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Capex -0.753*** -0.775*** 
 (0.162) (0.166) 
Cf_Sigma 1.118***  
 (0.373)  
Div 0.085*** 0.072*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
Top1 -0.131 -0.110 
 (0.150) (0.146) 
Firm FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
City*Year FE Y N 
Industry*Year FE Y Y 
N 20,607 20,607 
Adj_R2 0.675 0.684 
This table estimates the effect of share pledging on firm cash holdings when controlling for high-degree fixed effects. 
All of the variables are as defined in Table A.1 in this Appendix. The sample period covers the years 2005 through 2015. 
All of our regressions control for year- and firm-fixed effects. The robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
In Table 8, we replace the main measures of share pledging and firm cash holdings by several alternative measures and 
re-estimate the baseline regression. In Column (1), we use the indicator variable of whether a firm involves in share 
pledging activities, Pledge_Dummy, as the main explanatory variable. In Column (2), we use shares owned by the top 
10 largest shareholders as the deflator of total pledged shares and construct Pledge_Top as the main explanatory 
variable. In Column (3), we do not take the logarithm transformation to the main dependent variable and employ Cash 
to measure cash holdings. In Column (4), the dependent variable is changes in cash holdings, ΔCash, the ratio of (cash 
and cash equivalents in year t minus cash and cash equivalents in year t-1) to total assets in year t-1. Our baseline 
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Table 8. Alternative Measures 
 Log(Cash) Cash ΔCash 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pledge   -0.022** -0.043** 
   (0.009) (0.021) 
Pledge_Dummy -0.063***    
 (0.019)    
Pledge_Top  -0.124**   
  (0.049)   
Size 0.055** 0.053** 0.003 0.107*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.003) (0.006) 
Leverage -1.553*** -1.549*** -0.155*** -0.074*** 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.010) (0.016) 
Log(Age) -0.880*** -0.885*** -0.155*** -0.437*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.004) (0.012) 
MB 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.005*** 0.017*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) 
Opcf 1.452*** 1.456*** 0.210*** 0.398*** 
 (0.104) (0.103) (0.012) (0.026) 
Gsale 0.069*** 0.069*** -0.007*** 0.098*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.002) (0.009) 
Capex -0.608*** -0.610*** -0.238*** -0.916*** 
 (0.152) (0.152) (0.019) (0.048) 
Cf_Sigma 0.834** 0.808** 0.097** 0.094 
 (0.366) (0.367) (0.042) (0.095) 
Div 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.002 -0.129*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.002) (0.006) 
Top1 -0.162 -0.140 -0.035** -0.141*** 
 (0.141) (0.140) (0.015) (0.033) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
N 20,663 20,644 20,657 20,570 
Adj_R2 0.304 0.303 0.392 0.366 
This table estimates the effect of share pledging on firm cash holdings by using alternative measures of main variables. 
All of the variables are as defined in Table A.1 in this Appendix. The sample period covers the years 2005 through 2015. 
All of our regressions control for year- and firm-fixed effects. The robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
In Table 9, we conduct several other robustness checks. In Column (1), we include special treatment firms in the sample 
and re-estimate the baseline regression. In Column (2), we adopt a two-way cluster strategy. In Column (3), we exclude 
firms located in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong where listed firms are clustered. 
We further address the issue that some events occur in our sample period may bias our results. In Column (4), we 
exclude the observations during 2008-2009, as the financial crisis results in significant decreases in stock prices and 
may induce firms to adjust the amount of pledged shares and cash holdings simultaneously. Chen et al. (2012) indicate 
that Chinese listed firms experience a large reduction in cash holdings during 2005-2006 when most firms finish. In 
Column(6), we control for the effect of the split-share reforms. Therefore, to eliminate the effect of the split-share 
reform, we exclude observations in year 2005 and 2006 and re-estimate the baseline regression in Column (5). In 
Column (6), we consider the effect of the Labor Contract Law that carries out in 2008, as Cui et al. (2018) argue that 
labor protection laws significantly labor-intensive firms’ cash holdings. Following Ni and Zhu (2017) and Cui et al. 
(2018), we include an interaction term of labor intensity (Labor) and an indicator variable (Post08) of law enforcement 
and obtain positive and significant coefficient, that is consistent with Cui et al. (2018). More importantly, our main 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pledge -0.156** -0.180* -0.159** -0.144* -0.150** -0.251** 
 (0.068) (0.086) (0.077) (0.076) (0.064) (0.118) 
Labor*Post08      0.065*** 
      (0.020) 
Size 0.031 0.054* 0.071** 0.040 0.060* 0.075** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.031) (0.033) 
Leverage -1.477*** -1.551*** -1.595*** -1.579*** -1.561*** -1.378*** 
 (0.090) (0.109) (0.113) (0.090) (0.118) (0.128) 
Log(Age) -0.889*** -0.886*** -0.873*** -0.891*** -0.921*** -0.715*** 
 (0.027) (0.050) (0.036) (0.030) (0.026) (0.049) 
MB 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.077*** 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) 
Opcf 1.433*** 1.453*** 1.406*** 1.482*** 1.329*** 1.288*** 
 (0.106) (0.138) (0.156) (0.132) (0.117) (0.134) 
Gsale 0.080*** 0.069** 0.103*** 0.082*** 0.055** 0.095*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.032) (0.025) (0.021) (0.028) 
Capex -0.609*** -0.607*** -0.396* -0.643*** -0.640*** -0.069 
 (0.151) (0.153) (0.214) (0.188) (0.209) (0.206) 
Cf_Sigma 0.963*** 0.815* 0.598 0.915** 0.951** 0.660 
 (0.366) (0.395) (0.471) (0.381) (0.380) (0.451) 
Div 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.063*** 0.081*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) 
Top1 -0.132 -0.124 -0.275** -0.053 -0.290** -0.320 
 (0.140) (0.148) (0.116) (0.111) (0.126) (0.199) 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 21,575 20,644 14,302 17,613 18,155 11,021 
Adj_R2 0.289 0.664 0.296 0.313 0.318 0.171 
This table estimates the effect of share pledging on firm cash holdings through other robustness checks. All of the 
variables are as defined in Table A.1 in this Appendix. The sample period covers the years 2005 through 2015. All of 
our regressions control for year- and firm-fixed effects. The robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
5. Further Analysis 
5.1 Cross-Sectional Differences 
Lastly, we investigate cross-sectional variation in firm characteristics to find whether such patterns are consistent with 
our predictions. As we argue that share pledging leads to a reduction in firm risk-taking through alleviating financial 
constraints, we conjecture that the negative effect of share pledging should be more pronounced for financial 
constrained firms. 
There are several financial constraint indexes (e.g., KZ index, WW index, and HP index, etc.) that are widely used in 
previous literature. However, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) point out that many popular measures based on 
accounting data are likely flawed. Also, as most of them are constructed based on U.S. listed firms, one may argue that 
these popular measures of financial constraints may be not applicable to Chinese listed firms. Therefore, we follow 
Chen et al. (2012) and use two proxy variables developed by Almeida et al. (2004): firm size and firm age, as larger and 
older firms are less likely to be financial constrained because they have more collaterals and higher visibility to outside 
investors. 
We report regression results in Table 10. Estimation results show the coefficients on both Pledge*Size and 
Pledge*Log(Age) are positive and significant, indicating that the negative effect of share pledging on cash holdings 
concentrate in smaller and young firms (i.e. more constrained firms). These results further indicate that share pledging 
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relieves financial constraints of firms and reduces cash holdings.  
Table 10. Cross-Sectional Evidence 
 Log(Cash) 
 (1) (2) 
Pledge*Size 0.148**  
 (0.069)  
Pledge*Log(Age)  0.238** 
  (0.111) 
Pledge -3.377** -0.697*** 
 (1.515) (0.233) 
Size 0.037 0.050** 
 (0.028) (0.025) 
Leverage -1.554*** -1.544*** 
 (0.091) (0.091) 
Log(Age) -0.878*** -0.872*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) 
MB 0.052*** 0.051*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Opcf 1.454*** 1.451*** 
 (0.103) (0.103) 
Gsale 0.070*** 0.070*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
Capex -0.601*** -0.609*** 
 (0.152) (0.152) 
Cf_Sigma 0.836** 0.841** 
 (0.367) (0.366) 
Div 0.078*** 0.080*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
Top1 -0.122 -0.128 
 (0.141) (0.141) 
Firm FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
N 20,644 20,644 
Adj_R2 0.303 0.303 
This table estimates the effect of share pledging on firm cash holdings by exploring cross-sectional differences. All of 
the variables are as defined in Table A.1 in this Appendix. The sample period covers the years 2005 through 2015. All of 
our regressions control for year- and firm-fixed effects. The robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
5.2 The Effect on Cash/Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
In Table 11, to throw additional light on how share pledging affects firm cash holdings, we examine the effect of share 
pledging on cash/investment-cash flow sensitivities. The effects of the share pledging through the financial constraint 
channel will reduce the propensity to accumulate cash, as captured by either the investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity 
measure developed in Fazzari et al. (1988) or the cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity measure developed in Almeida et al. 
(2004). Evidence results indicate that firms with more pledged shares have lower cash/investment-cash flow 
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Table 11. The Effect of Share Pledging on Cash/Investment-cash flow Sensitivity 
 ΔCash Capex 
 (1) (2) 
Pledge*Cashflow -0.617*** -0.077* 
 (0.207) (0.042) 
Pledge -0.218*** -0.027*** 
 (0.022) (0.004) 
Cashflow 0.766*** 0.086*** 
 (0.044) (0.009) 
Size 0.048*** 0.009*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) 
MB 0.007*** 0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
Capex -0.819*** 1.316*** 
 (0.048) (0.012) 
ΔWk 0.383*** 0.059*** 
 (0.023) (0.005) 
ΔSdebt 0.336*** 0.092*** 
 (0.020) (0.005) 
Firm FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
N 20,624 20,624 
Adj_R2 0.232 0.762 
This table estimates the effect of share pledging on cash/investment-cash flow sensitivity. All of the variables are as 
defined in Table A.1 in this Appendix. The sample period covers the years 2005 through 2015. All of our regressions 
control for year- and firm-fixed effects. The robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. The coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
5.3 The Effect on Cash Dividend Payouts 
In Table 12, we examine where the cash goes when the firm reduces cash holdings in view of cash dividend payouts. 
We conjecture that firms with pledged shares may increase cash dividend payouts in the meantime of reducing cash 
holdings. To construct dependent variables Div_Asset and Div_Sale, we use total assets and total sales as denominators 
of cash dividends. The coefficients on Pledge are positive and significant in both columns, indicating that share 
pledging induces firms to increase cash dividend payouts as a source of reducing cash holdings. As dividend payout is 
also a measure of financial constraint, the evidence provides further support on that share pledging can alleviate 
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Table 12. Share Pledging and Cash Dividend Payouts 
 Div_Asset Div_Sale 
 (1) (2) 
Pledge 0.002* 0.006** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Size 0.001*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Leverage -0.013*** -0.026*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Log(Age) -0.007*** -0.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
MB 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Opcf 0.021*** 0.030*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Gsale 0.001*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Capex -0.003 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.006) 
Cf_Sigma 0.017*** 0.027** 
 (0.005) (0.012) 
Top1 0.004** 0.007* 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
Firm FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
N 20,692 20,692 
Adj_R2 0.122 0.109 
This table estimates the effect of share pledging on cash dividend payouts. All of the variables are as defined in Table 
A.1 in this Appendix. The sample period covers the years 2005 through 2015. All of our regressions control for year- 
and firm-fixed effects. The robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
5.4 Alternative Explanation 
Lastly, we consider an alternative explanation. Following previous literature (e.g. Chen et al., 2012; Li et al., 2017), we 
employ two measures of controlling shareholder expropriation. The first one is the divergence between controlling 
shareholders’ voting rights and cash-flow rights (Separation), an increase of which leads to increased entrenchment and 
tunneling and lower firm value (Claessens et al., 2002; Li et al., 2017). The second one is the product of total shares 
held by the second to the fifth largest shareholders as a percentage of total shares outstanding and a Herfindahl index for 
the concentration of shares among these shareholders (Monitor), constructed following Chen et al. (2012). Large 
shareholders have both the incentive to monitor insiders’ behavior and the ability to do so. However, the monitoring 
effectiveness of large shareholders will be attenuated if there is a free rider problem (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). 
We report estimation results in Table 13. If the above explanation holds, we should observe more pronounced effect of 
share pledging for firms suffer from severer controlling shareholder expropriation (i.e. negative and significant 
coefficient on Pledge*Separation, and positive and significant coefficient on Pledge*Monitor). However, we fail to 
observe that the degree of controlling shareholder expropriation makes a difference on the effect of share pledging on 
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Table 13. Alternative Explanation 
 Log(Cash) 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
Pledge*Separation 0.006    
 (0.007)    
Pledge*Monitor  -6.338   
  (3.981)   
Pledge*SOE    -0.012 
    (0.162) 
Separation 0.001    
 (0.002)    
Monitor  1.111   
  (1.774)   
SOE    0.053 
    (0.061) 
Pledge -0.187* -0.140*  -0.167** 
 (0.101) (0.072)  (0.071) 
Size 0.053** 0.053**  0.053** 
 (0.026) (0.026)  (0.025) 
Leverage -1.504*** -1.550***  -1.553*** 
 (0.091) (0.091)  (0.090) 
Log(Age) -0.898*** -0.881***  -0.887*** 
 (0.028) (0.026)  (0.028) 
MB 0.050*** 0.052***  0.052*** 
 (0.008) (0.009)  (0.009) 
Opcf 1.438*** 1.452***  1.452*** 
 (0.105) (0.122)  (0.122) 
Gsale 0.066*** 0.069***  0.070*** 
 (0.022) (0.025)  (0.025) 
Capex -0.548*** -0.610***  -0.603*** 
 (0.156) (0.185)  (0.184) 
Cf_Sigma 0.806** 0.820**  0.815** 
 (0.376) (0.361)  (0.360) 
Div 0.080*** 0.079***  0.079*** 
 (0.016) (0.015)  (0.015) 
Top1 -0.162 -0.115  -0.128 
 (0.147) (0.121)  (0.112) 
Firm FE Y Y  Y 
Year FE Y Y  Y 
N 19,683 20,644  20,644 
Adj_R2 0.303 0.303  0.303 
This table examines whether the effect of share pledging on firm cash holdings is consistent with an alternative 
explantion. All of the variables are as defined in Table A.1 in this Appendix. The sample period covers the years 2005 
through 2015. All of our regressions control for year- and firm-fixed effects. The robust standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are 
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between share pledging and firm cash holdings. Based on the universe of 
Chinese listed firms from 2005 through 2015, we find that share pledging is associated with a higher level of cash 
holdings, and the effect is more pronounced for financial constrained firms. In addition, share pledging is associated 
with lower cash/investment-cash flow sensitivities and more cash dividend payouts. Our findings indicate that share 
pledging can alleviate financial constraints of listed firms, which identifies an important channel through which share 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Cash Cash holdings, the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to net assets (total assets minus cash and cash 
equivalents) 
Log(Cash) Cash holdings, the logarithm of Cash. 
ΔCash Change in cash holdings, the ratio of (cash and cash equivalents in year t minus cash and cash 
equivalents in year t-1) to total assets in year t-1. 
Pledge Share pledging ratio, the number of shares pledged by controlling shareholders as a percentage of 
total shares by the end of a given year. 
Pledge_Dummy Share pledging dummy, a dummy variable that equals to one if the fraction of share pledging is 
larger than zero by the end of a given year, and zero otherwise.  
Pledge_Top Share pledging ratio, the number of shares pledged by controlling shareholders as a percentage of 
total shares owned by the top 10 largest shareholders by the end of a given year. 
Size Firm size, the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Leverage Firm leverage, the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Log(Age) Firm age, the logarithm of one plus the current year, minus the listing year. 
MB Market-to-book ratio, the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. 
Opcf Operating cash flow, the ratio of net cash flows from operating activities to total assets. 
Cashflow Operating cash flow, the ratio of net cash flows from operating activities in year t to total assets in 
year t-1. 
Gsale Sales growth, the ratio of (total sales in year t minus total sales in year t-1) to total sales in year t-1. 
Capex Capital expenditures, the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. 
Cf_Sigma Cash flow volatility, the standard deviation of Opcf in the industry in a given year. 
Div Dividend payout, a dummy variable equals to one if the firm pays out cash dividend in a given year, 
and zero otherwise.  
Div_Asset Dividend payout, the ratio of cash dividends to total assets.  
Div_Sale Dividend payout, the ratio of cash dividends to total sales. 
Top1 Ownership concentration, the fraction of shares held by the largest shareholder. 
Treat An indicator variable of the treatment group that equals to one if a firm’s amount of pledged shares 
increase the most (in the top three deciles of the sample) around the regulatory change in 2013, and 
zero otherwise.  
Post An indicator variable of the regulatory change in 2013 that equals to one if it is year 2013 or after, 
and zero otherwise.  
Labor Labor intensity, the ratio of the number of employees (times 10^8) to total assets. I measure this 
variable using the data of 2007.  
Post08 An indicator variable of the Labor Contract Law that equals to one if it is year 2008 or after, and zero 
otherwise. 
ΔWk Changes in net working capital, the ratio of [working capital minus working capital in year t-1 minus 
(cash and cash equivalents in year t minus cash and cash equivalents in year t-1)] to total assets in 
year t-1.  
ΔSdebt Changes in short-term debt, the ratio of (current debt in year t minus current debt in year t-1) to total 
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